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Borrowing the rational institutionalist framework developed by Koremenos. 
Lipson, and Snidal, this study seeks to shed light on the striking institutional 
differences of various methods of international commercial dispute resolution 
for private parties. These methods include recourse to public courts or - much 
more frequently - to private international courts, such as the International Court 
of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce or the London Court 
of International Arbitration, as well as recourse to so-called ’ad hoc’ arbitration 
and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) techniques, such as conciliation and 
mediation. The key institutional dimensions along which these methods of 
international dispute resolution vary are 1) procedural and adaptive flexibility 
and 2) centralization of provision of procedural safeguards and information 
collection. The study seeks to explain why different methods of international 
commercial dispute resolution are selected. It argues that these methods respond 
to varying institutional needs of different types of disputes and disputants. Such 
needs can be explained in terms of the following factors:
1) uncertainty about the preferences or behavior of contractual partners;
2) uncertainty about the present and future ’states of the world;’ and























































































































































































Two distinguished international arbitrators. Alan Redfem and Martin Hunter, 
recently observed that the study of the practice of international commercial 
arbitration is like peering into the dark.1 2Arbitration is a form of proceeding 
which is private between the parties; thus few awards are published and even 
fewer procedural decisions of arbitral tribunals see the light of day.' René 
David, a leading French expert of international arbitration, has similarly noted: 
"[S]ecrecy, which is one of the reasons why arbitration is resorted to by the 
parties, is easily extended...to everything concerning arbitration."3 Information 
mainly comes from tapping the experience of the principal arbitral institutions 
or by looking at individual cases which come before the courts, either as a result 
of enforcement proceedings or because an arbitral award is challenged by the 
losing party.
Despite this difficulty, international arbitration is a topic that deserves 
much closer attention by scholars of international relations. After retreating 
from the international scene during the age of nation-state ideology in the 19th 
Century, international commercial arbitration has been staging a formidable 
comeback in the past twenty years. Today it calls to memory the flourishing era 
of arbitration practices and institutions of international trade fairs in medieval 
Europe. The number of arbitration fora has grown from a dozen or so in the 
1970s to more than one hundred in the 1990s, and the caseload of major arbitral 
institutions has more than doubled during the same period.4 Lawyers and judges 
agree that "there is [now] clear evidence of something of a world 
movement...towards international arbitration."5 The Economist recently called
1 I am grateful to Ken Abbott, Beth Yarbrough, Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, Ronald 
Mitchell, Antonio Ortiz, and Duncan Snidal for excellent written comments on earlier drafts 
of this paper. I also thank Debbie Davenport, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane, Lisa Martin and 
the participants of the Rational International Institutions Project (RHP) and of the Program on 
International Politics, Economics, and Security (PIPES) at the University of Chicago for 
helpful suggestions. Special thanks to Dominique Hascher, General Counsel and Deputy 
Secretary General of the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of 
Commerce in Paris, for inviting me to do an internship at the Court in the Spring of 1998, and 
to Anne-Marie Whitesell for welcoming me to her legal team at the Court. In addition, I have 
greatly benefitted from discussions on international commercial arbitration with Adrian 
Winstanley of the London Court of International Arbitration, Eva Müller of the Arbitration 
Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, as well as Gerald Aksen, Alessandra 
Casella, Yves Dezalay, Bryant Garth, Thomas Heller, Christian Joerges, William Park, Martin 
Shapiro, Hans Smit, Francis Snyder, and Job Taylor.
2 Redfem and Hunter 1991, xv.
3 David 1985,31.
4 See Brown 1993.




























































































arbitration "the Big Idea set to dominate legal-reform agendas into the next 
century."6
The growing importance of arbitration institutions is not the sole 
motivation to study these fora; there is a deeper analytical interest. International 
relations scholars have traditionally focused on inter-governmental international 
organization; little attention has been paid to private international institutional 
arrangements.7 This omission has at times rendered a genuine assessment of the 
efficiency or effectiveness of public organizations difficult because it robs the 
analysis of the comparative institutional basis needed to evaluate issues of 
institutional performance. Thus, for example, a better understanding of the 
workings of international arbitration fora may help us to better assess the 
strengths and weaknesses of certain public judicial procedures and institutions.
This study offers an introduction into the arcane world of modem 
international commercial arbitration from a social science perspective, thus 
following the lead of recent work by Alessandra Casella, Claire Cutler, and 
Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth. Casella has developed a general equilibrium 
model of the relationship between the expansion of international trade and the 
adoption of arbitration. Her model shows that the availability of arbitration 
influences the size and composition of markets; but arbitration and legal arbitral 
doctrines are themselves shaped by the exogenous growth of markets.8 Cutler 
has offered a review of the historical evolution of private dispute settlement in 
international trade that contrasts with conventional historical narratives. She 
examines how economic and political elites have, at various times, manipulated 
the boundary between the economic and political spheres as a means of 
regulating commerce.9 Building on the structural approach developed by the 
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, Dezalay and Garth have provided a 
comprehensive account of the evolution of modem international commercial 
arbitration practices and institutions. They have also explored how these 
international legal developments, in turn, have transformed domestic methods 
for handling disputes.10
The analysis in this study is not primarily concerned with issues of 
institutional evolution, and it is not confined to international commercial 
arbitration; it focuses more broadly on fora of international commercial dispute 
resolution for private parties. More specifically this study seeks to shed light on
6 The Economist, 18-24 July 1992, 17 of survey on the legal profession. See also Wetter 1995.
7 One exception is Lipson 1985.
8 Casella 1996.
9 Cutler 1995.




























































































the striking institutional differences of various methods of international 
commercial dispute resolution, using the rational institutional framework 
developed by Koremenos. Lipson. and Snidal 11 These methods include 
recourse to public courts or - much more frequently - to private international 
courts, such as the International Court of Arbitration of the International 
Chamber of Commerce or the London Court of International Arbitration, as 
well as recourse to so-called ’ad hoc’ arbitration and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) techniques, such as conciliation and mediation. The key 
institutional dimensions along which these methods of international dispute 
resolution vary are 1) procedural and adaptive flexibility and 2) centralization 
of provision of procedural safeguards and information collection. For example, 
flexibility is typically much lower in public court proceedings than in 
arbitration or ADR; and centralization is present in the case of institutional 
arbitration but not in ad hoc arbitration or ADR.
The study seeks to explain why different methods of international 
commercial dispute resolution are selected. It argues that these methods respond 
to varying institutional needs of different types of disputes and disputants. Such 
needs can be explained in terms of the following factors: 1) uncertainty about 
the parties’ preferences or behavior; 2) uncertainty about the present and future 
'states of the world;' and 3) the number and asymmetry of the parties involved in 
a dispute.
The framework study by Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal argues that 
international institutions can be understood either as the direct products of 
rational design or as indirect products of rational selection among institutions 
(where actors favor institutions that are more effective or appropriate). Most of 
the studies written for this project provide examples of the direct rational 
design. My study is an illustration of the indirect rational design type. It 
describes a ’market’ of dispute resolution methods where different ’suppliers’ 
offer different venues which the firms on the demand side select in terms of 
their design problem. This creates an accelerated evolutionary process (i.e., 
accelerated by rational anticipation of what will sell and what will work) and 
the final result will be very much the same as a direct rational design effort.12
The study elaborates several conjectures, linking institutional features of 
dispute resolution methods to the needs or demands of private parties. These 
conjectures can be summarized as follows:
11 Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal forthcoming.
12 As illustrated below, the distinction between suppliers and demanders is useful analytically, 
but in practice it is often blurred since private dispute resolution methods are mostly provided 




























































































First, centralization of fora to which private international parties resort to 
resolve their disputes increases with uncertainty about the parties' preferences 
or behavior (CENT|UNCERT). Such uncertainty may be low, for example, if 
the parties are locked in a mutually beneficial long-term commercial 
relationship; in this case, the parties’ institutional demands for resolving 
disputes will be markedly lower than those of firms in a one-shot business 
encounter or of parties whose commercial relationship has come to an end. 
Centralization is also likely to increase with the parties’ uncertainty about the 
present ’state of the world,’ that is, with the parties’ relative lack of information, 
for example, about the legal environment (the laws and integrity of judges) in 
which arbitration takes place and about the conditions for enforceability of 
arbitral awards (CENT|UNCERT(S)). More generally, traders with little 
experience in international exchange or traders from very different cultural and 
linguistic regions may rely more heavily on centralized support and expertise 
for resolving their disputes than veteran traders operating in a relatively 
homogenous region.
Second, institutional flexibility is valued where uncertainty about the 
future ’state of the world’ is great (FLEX|UNCERT(S)). For example, firms 
operating at the forefront of new production and exchange methods are likely to 
prefer a flexible form of dispute resolution allowing them to tailor rules 
regarding procedure, evidence, and even the substance of the case to their 
evolving needs.13
Third, the larger the number of parties to a dispute, the higher the 
coordination and administrative demands on the dispute resolution form, and 
thus the greater the need for centralization (CENT|NUMB).
Finally, the greater the asymmetry of distribution of bargaining power 
among the parties, the less likely the dominant player will compromise over the 
terms of dispute resolution. Such a player may thus choose a relatively 
inflexible form of dispute resolution that fits his preferences.
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a brief review and 
critique of themes in the institutional literature in international relations and 
economics that are relevant to this study. Section 3 presents the key institutional 
differences among the various methods of international commercial dispute 
resolution. It also introduces the principal international arbitral fora. Section 4 
seeks to explain institutional differences within the framework offered by





























































































Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of ways 
of broadening the study.
2. PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE INSTITUTIONAL 
LITERATURE
Political scientists and economists have developed two theoretical schools, 
regime theory and New Institutional Economics (NIE), respectively, that seek to 
explain institutional arrangements. Unfortunately, however, the two schools 
have based their theories, in part, on assumptions that move the theories’ reach 
away from the types of institutional arrangements discussed in this study.
International regimes’ are defined broadly as sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.14 In a world of 
rapidly growing interdependence, regimes are said to help states correct ’market 
failures’ stemming from asymmetric information, moral hazard, risk, and 
uncertainty.15 Regime theory has shed important light on the nature of interstate 
relations but it has overlooked the importance of non-state actors in 
international relations. In particular, it has failed to examine the extent to which 
international market players themselves are capable of remedying so-called 
'market failures’ through the creation of private institutional arrangements. This 
failure has deprived the theory of a comparative institutional perspective 
necessary to assess the desirability of intergovernmental regimes. Only a 
comparative institutional analysis that weighs the costs and benefits of both 
private and public institutional remedies of 'market failures’ can provide a 
framework to address questions of efficiency and optimal institutional design.16 
This critique need not imply that regime theory is flawed; it suggests, however, 
that the theory could be strengthened by extending its focus beyond state 
behavior. For example, there is nothing that keeps the Chamber of Commerce 
from being viewed as a regime for its members, as will be shown below.
Institutional Economics, also called New Institutional Economics (NIE), 
is a rapidly growing field that has developed from the pioneering work of Oliver 
Williamson. It offers a rigorous conceptual framework for comparative 
institutional analysis.17 NIE seeks to explain varying types of industrial 
organization, from straightforward market exchange to vertically integrated
11 Krasner 1983, 2.
15 Keohane 1984, 93.
16 A related point is made in Demsetz 1969.




























































































exchange, based on differences in transaction costs. The principal dimensions 
with respect to which transactions differ are asset specificity, uncertainty, and 
frequency. The first is the most important: it represents the degree to which 
durable investments are made to support particular transactions.
NIE postulates that transaction costs are economized by assigning 
transactions (which differ in their attributes) to governance structures (the 
adaptive capacities and associated costs of which differ) in a discriminating 
way. Governance structures are the organizational frameworks within which the 
integrity of a contractual relation is decided and maintained. In particular, the 
higher the asset specificity, the greater the institutional complexity to promote 
efficient exchange. Examples of governance structures include economic 
hostages, vertical integration, unitization, and multinationalism.18
Nevertheless, the Williamsonian framework is not without shortcomings. 
For example, none of Williamson’s governance structures would be needed if 
courts were able to resolve disputes swiftly and at low cost. But Williamson 
argues that court ordering or legal centralism is inefficient. "Most studies of 
exchange assume that efficacious rules of law regarding contract disputes are in 
place and are applied by the courts in an informed, sophisticated, and low-cost 
way...The facts, however, disclose otherwise. Most disputes, including many 
that under current rules could be brought to a court, are resolved by avoidance, 
self-help, and the like...[And] because the efficacy of court ordering is 
problematic, contract execution falls heavily on [governance structures]."19 This 
proposition is problematic. First, courts are institutions, too. A comparative 
institutional analysis that sets aside a large universe of institutions on the 
grounds of their alleged inefficiency risks being internally inconsistent. Within 
a Williamsonian framework, it is incomprehensible why inefficient institutions 
come into being or survive. Second, even if it established analytically (by way 
of ad hoc assumptions) that public courts and public law are inefficient, there 
remains the question of why NIE does not consider their next best substitutes, 
namely private courts and private law.
In short, NIE provides a sophisticated analytical framework for studying 
varying forms of governance. However, by overlooking the importance 
particularly of private courts and law, NIE may be accused of truncating the full 
range of variation on the dependent variable (governance forms) and thus 
suffering from selection bias. Williamson recognized that ”a place for law
18 Beth and Robert Yarbrough have recently added to this list various forms of trade 
liberalization. Their analysis is a good example of how NIE can enrich the study of 
international institutional arrangements. See Yarbrough and Yarbrough. 1992.




























































































[should] properly [be] provided in any comprehensive study of contract."20 Beth 
and Robert Yarbrough have responded to this invitation and are presently 
extending the Williamsonian framework to incorporate law and public courts in 
a way that is consonant with the analysis offered in this study. Courts, they 
argue, are not generically inefficient; rather they are not very efficacious for 
certain types of transactions. One type is those transactions in which asset 
specificity makes the historical context of a relationship Critical to solving 
disputes. A second type is those in which the confrontational nature of court 
proceedings risks damaging future relations (hence, courts’ historical reluctance, 
until recently, to become involved in many family matters). In such cases, the 
Yarbroughs predict non-court means of dispute settlement.21
20 Ibid., 168.




























































































3. INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION METHODS
The range of methods of international commercial dispute resolution is wide. It 
includes litigation in public courts, several arbitration options, and so-called 
Alternative Dispute Resolution techniques. This section offers a brief 
description of the various methods, highlighting their institutional 
characteristics.
Flexibility in Dispute Resolution
In the domestic context, parties who seek a binding method of resolving 
disputes through third-party intervention have the choice between a national 
public court and private arbitration. In the international context, such choice 
does not exist because there are no international public courts that handle 
international commercial disputes involving only private parties.22 Therefore, 
the choice for international private parties is between recourse to a national 
court (i.e., litigation) and recourse to private international dispute resolution, 
such as international arbitration and ADR.'3
Arbitration is a binding, non-judicial and private means of settling 
disputes based on an explicit agreement by the parties involved in a transaction. 
It entrusts the settlement of a question to one or more persons who derive their 
powers from the private agreement.24 25Arbitration becomes international when 
the parties to a dispute reside or conduct their main business in different 
countries. The term 'commercial’ in international commercial arbitration is 
broadly conceived and covers activities such as sales of goods, distribution 
agreements, commercial representation of agency, leasing, consulting, banking, 
insurance, transportation, construction work, joint venture and other forms of 
industrial or business cooperation.'5
A key feature of arbitration is its high degree of procedural flexibility. 
Arbitration provides the parties with full control over the arbitral process. The
22 The only exception is the European Court of Justice which may deal with certain disputes 
between private parties under Community law. Redfem and Hunter 1991, 25; Burley and 
Mattli, 1993.
23 The term jurisdiction clause’ in an international contract is generally used to describe a 
forum selection that designates a public court to hear a case, while ’arbitration clause’ makes 
reference to private international dispute resolution.
24 Mustill and Boyd 1989, 38-50.
25 This definition is suggested in the United Nations Commission for Trade Law 




























































































parties may decide the number of arbitrators comprising the arbitral tribunal, the 
appointment procedure of the arbitrators, the place of arbitration, the powers of 
the tribunal, and the applicable law in the dispute. In contrast, a trial before a 
national court must be conducted in accordance with the rules of that court. 
Further, public court proceedings are typically open to the public, and court 
decisions are published and readily available. Arbitral proceedings, however, 
are held in private; details about the cases, including the arbitral awards, are 
confidential. Privacy may help firms to hide a number of facts from competitors 
and the public in general, such as trade secrets and know-how not guaranteed by 
patents, or financial difficulties and other problems. Nevertheless, the parties 
may choose to publize arbitral decisions either to create precedents or to 
provide authoritative interpretations of standard contract terms.26
Flexibility characterizes not only arbitral procedures but also the actual 
institutions of arbitration, such as the International Court of Arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, the London Court of International 
Arbitration, and the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce. These fora can respond much more speedily to demands for new 
dispute resolution rules and services than public courts. The reason is evident: 
Private courts are demand-driven. The very same market actors who request 
new rules also control these courts. As noted by Casella, these fora are shaped 
from the ’bottom’, that is, by the firms that voluntarily finance and share the 
’club goods’ they need.27 Thus, the demanders are also the suppliers; they 
possess full information on how new business practices or changing market 
conditions affect their dispute resolution needs. They are capable of quickly 
responding to new needs by creating new services and by rewriting the charters 
of their courts. The frequent revisions of the rules of major arbitral institutions 
attest to the high degree of institutional flexibility of these fora.
Many of today’s arbitration practices evoke Medieval Europe’s private 
courts and the Law Merchant, a body of private commercial rules and principles 
that were distinct from the ordinary law of the land. The merchant courts sat in
26 Cost is factor, unrelated to flexibility, that is frequently said to distinguish litigation from 
arbitration. Arbitration centers, for example, claim that litigation is much more expensive than 
arbitration. This need not necessarily be true, however. First, although litigants do not pay the 
salary of a judge, parties involved in arbitration must pay the fees and expenses of the 
arbitrators. Second, litigants are not charged for the use of the public facilities of the courts of 
law, but the parties in arbitration pay the administrative fees and expenses of an arbitral 
institution and these can be substantial, particularly when they are assessed by reference to the 
amount in dispute. In short, arbitration may or may not be less expensive than litigation, much 
depends on the specifics of the case and the attitude of the parties to a dispute. As a result, 





























































































fairs, markets, seaport towns, and most other large centers of commercial 
activity. Merchant courts chose as judges merchants who possessed intimate 
knowledge of particular commercial practices and techniques. Mitchell, a 
historian of the Law Merchant, writes: ’The summary' nature of its 
jurisdiction...characterized the Lex Mercatoria. Its justice was prompt..[and] the 
time within which disputes [had to] be finally settled was narrowly limited. "2f 
Sea merchants, for example, demanded that disputes be settled ’’from tide to tide 
according to the ancient law marine and ancient customs of the sea...without 
mixing the law civil with the law maritime."28 9 Another reason for using guild 
courts was that ”[u]nder severest penalties, [they] forbade [guild] members to 
appeal, in cases where they alone were concerned, to any court save that of the 
guild."30 Merchant courts relied on sanctions such as ostracism and boycott of 
all future trade in order to ensure that traders would be held to the resolution 
dictated by the arbiters.31
Besides arbitration and litigation, there are so-called Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) techniques. The most widely known forms of ADR are 
conciliation and mediation. Like arbitration, conciliation and mediation offer 
the parties great procedural flexibility. The parties pick conciliators or 
arbitrators of their choice and design procedures that best fit their cases. 
Typically, a mediator seeks to reduce the distance between the parties’ 
positions, and make the parties understand each other’s point of view in order 
that they may themselves achieve a compromise solution. A conciliator 
performs a different function. After consulting all sides and evaluating the 
evidence, the conciliator draws up the terms of a solution that is hopefully 
acceptable to all parties involved in the dispute. Conciliation and mediation 
differ in one important respect from arbitration: they do not result in a binding 
or enforceable award. A mediator cannot compel the parties to reach a 
settlement, and a conciliator has no power to impose his or her compromise 
solution on the parties.32
28 Mitchell, W. 1904, 12-13.
29 Ibid., 20.
30 Ibid., 42,
31 Benson 1989. See also Milgrom, North, and Weingast 1990; and Greif, Milgrom, and 
Weingast 1994.
32 For this reason, ADR is sometimes combined with an adjudicatory process as a fail-back 
solution. For example, a contract may provide for a specific time-limit to start some form of 





























































































International commercial arbitration can be conducted in two ways, as 
institutional arbitration or ad hoc arbitration. Institutional arbitration is done 
under the aegis of an arbitral institution, usually in accordance with the 
institution’s own rules of arbitration. '3 The most established of these institutions 
are the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of 
Commerce, the London Court of International Arbitration, and the Arbitration 
Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.'4 Many more arbitral 
institutions have been set up in the past decade, notably in Asia, the Middle 
East, and North America.33 34*
Ad hoc arbitration differs from institutional arbitration in that it does not 
rely on the supervision or formal administration of an arbitration center. In this 
sense it is the least institutionalist form of arbitration. In ad hoc arbitration, the 
parties are 'on their own;' they are not bound by time limits set by arbitral 
institutions and their proceedings are not monitored by any central body. The 
parties can leave the issuance of arbitration procedures to their arbitrators or 
develop their own rules and design their own arbitral management either in the 
initial contract or after a dispute has arisen. Alternatively, the parties may 
simply adopt or adapt the rules of one of the major arbitration centers, but, 
again, without entrusting the administration of the arbitration to such centers.36 
Another increasingly popular option is to use the arbitration rules of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law of 1976 (UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules). Reference in the parties’ contract to the UNICTRAL rules
Centralization of Dispute Resolution Fora
33 Institutional arbitration is also referred to in the literature as ’administered' or ’supervised’ 
arbitration. On institutional arbitration, see Slate 1996; Hoeliering 1994; Vigrass 1993; and 
Graving 1989.
34 Another major institution is the American Arbitration Association (AAA). Its focus is 
primarily on domestic arbitration, and for this reason, it is omitted from the discussion below. 
The AAA handles yearly about 40,000 domestic arbitration cases and about 200 international 
arbitration cases.
33 Due to limited space, this study focuses primarily on international commercial arbitration 
and does not consider the more specialized arbitration as offered, for example, by the Society 
of Maritime Arbitration (New York), the Grain and Feed Trade Association (London), and 
various stock and commodity exchanges. Nevertheless, I would argue that the framework used 
here does shed light on some key institutional features of commodity trade and maritime 
arbitration. See concluding section of this study. See also Mentschikoff 1961; Harris, 
Summerskill, and Cockerill 1993; Summerskill 1993; Covo 1993; and Johnson 1991, 1993.
36 In ad hoc arbitration, parties may rely nevertheless on an ’appointing authority’ (e.g., a court, 





























































































will immediately incorporate a full-blown set of procedures designed specially 
for ad hoc arbitration/7
Ad hoc arbitration for international commercial dispute resolution is 
similar to ADR in that neither the mediator nor the conciliator is monitored by 
any central institution. Like the mediator and conciliator, the arbitrator in an ad 
hoc case depends entirely on the good will of the parties for a smooth process of 
dispute resolution. Ad hoc arbitration and ADR contrast sharply with 
institutional arbitration as offered, for example, by the International Court of 
Arbitration (ICA) of the International Chamber of Commerce, where the 
provision of procedural safeguards and information is highly centralized. They 
also differ from arbitration as conducted by the London Court of International 
Arbitration (LCIA), and the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce (SCC). These three institutions are considered in order.38 (Table 1 
summarizes the key institutional dimensions along which the various methods 
of international commercial dispute resolution vary.)
Table 1: The Varying Institutional Dimensions of International Commercial 
Dispute Resolution Methods




(public courts] [ICA. LCIA. SCC]





Centralized Monitoring and 
Other Safeguards
n.a. high to medium none 
n.a. high to medium none
37 On ad hoc arbitration, see Aksen 1991; and Arkin 1987.
38 Most of the information about these fora comes from interviews I conducted during an 
internship at the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC and visits to the LCIA and the 




























































































The International Chamber of Commerce and ICC Arbitration: The
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is a business organization offering a 
wide range of services to firms engaged in international trade and investment, 
including commercial dispute resolution. Founded in 1919. it counts today as 
members over 7.000 enterprises and commercial organizations in 114 countries. 
The ICC’s organizational structure includes a general secretariat in Paris, 
employing some 85 persons and a Secretary General. The supreme organ is the 
Council which meets twice a year. Members of the Council are appointed by the 
National Committees of the ICC. Each Committee may select one to three 
members according to its contribution to the ICC budget. The Council’s 
President is elected for a two-year term. The ICC has established several 
commissions and special committees to address major issues relating to 
international commerce, such as intellectual property, competition law, taxation, 
transportation, telecommunications, the environment, and bribery. Annual 
conferences are supplemented every three years by an ICC Congress, attended 
on average by some 1,000 participants.39
A major organization within the ICC is the International Court of 
Arbitration (ICA), established in 1923.40 The idea of such a court was 
conceived after World War I by businessmen wrestling with the practical 
difficulties of designing a dispute resolution process acceptable to merchants of 
different national backgrounds.41 It is composed of a chair, eight vice-chairs, 
and 57 members selected by the ICC National Committees and national 
professional organizations. The members are professors, former judges, 
barristers and lawyers with expertise in international commercial law and 
arbitration. They represent a wide range of legal traditions, including civil law, 
common law, and Islamic law. The Court meets four times a month, once in 
plenary session and three times as comité restraint. The ICA is assisted by a 
secretariat located at the headquarters of the ICC in Paris. The secretariat has a 
staff of 38 persons, including six teams of lawyers from various countries. It 
assumes responsibility for the day-to-day administration of ICC cases and keeps
J<> Craig, Park, and Paulsson 1990, 25-27.
40 Before 15 June 1989, the ICA’s name was Court of Arbitration of the ICC.
41 Craig, Park, and Paulsson 1990, xxi. The ICA is supplemented by four other ICC bodies 
dealing with the settlement of international commercial disputes. They are the Commission on 
International Arbitration, which advises on the development of ICC Rules of Conciliation and 
Arbitration; the International Maritime Arbitration Organization; the International Center for 
Technical Expertise; and the Standing Committee on Regulation of Contractual Relations, 
which gives parties the possibility of referring to a neutral outsider to adjust contracts whose 
performance is threatened by fundamentally changed circumstances. See Craig, Park, and 
Paulsson 1990, 27-28.




























































































copies of all written communications and pleadings exchanged in the arbitration 
proceedings. It also provides assistance and information to parties, counsel and 
arbitrators. The provision of centralized information is a particularly valuable 
service because in an international arbitration case many different national 
systems of law may need to be consulted, depending upon where the arbitration 
takes place and what issues are involved. Questions of the capacity of the 
parties to agree to arbitration, the validity of the arbitration agreement, the 
'arbitrability’ of the subject-matter of the dispute and the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards may all be determined by national arbitration 
laws.42
ICC arbitration is characterized not only by the high degree of centralized 
information gathering but also by the extensive monitoring offered by the 
Court. ICC arbitration proceeds in five steps:
1) The claimant submits a request for arbitration to the secretariat. The 
secretariat then transmits the request to the defendant who must respond within 
30 days.
2) The Court appoints arbitrators and chooses the place of arbitration when 
the parties do not make their own selection.43 In selecting the arbitrators, the 
Court relies in part on recommendations from the ICC National Committees. 
The Court also fixes the arbitrators’ fees and estimates the overall arbitration 
costs based on the amount in dispute. After receiving one half of the advance on 
arbitration costs, the secretariat transmits the file to the arbitral tribunal. The 
fixing of fees by the Court is intended to prevent the parties from being placed 
in the uncomfortable position of having to negotiate issues of remuneration with 
those who will be responsible for deciding their case or otherwise to avoid 
challenges to an arbitrator's independence.
3) Within two months of receiving the file, the tribunal submits a document 
called the Terms of Reference to the Court. This procedure can be compared to 
a pre-hearing conference and be viewed as an opportunity for the arbitrators to 
get to know each other and become familiar with the specifics of the case. The 
Terms summarize the parties’ respective claims, state the applicable law and the 
place of arbitration, and specify the procedural rules (rules regarding evidence 
and witness statement, etc.) The Court checks the Terms of Reference for 
conformity with ICC Rules.
4) As soon as the second half of the advance is paid, the arbitral tribunal 
proceeds with the case. Within six months (which the Court may extend), the 
tribunal submits a draft award to the Court.
42 Redfem and Hunter 1991, xvi. See also Gentinetta 1973.




























































































5) The Court scrutinizes the arbitral award. It may draw the arbitrators' 
attention to points of substance or may suggest modifications to the form of the 
award.44 Once the Court is satisfied it approves the award; the secretariat then 
notifies the parties.
The growing popularity of ICC arbitration is best reflected in the docket 
of the ICA. The first three thousand requests for arbitration were filed between 
1923 and 1977. The next three thousand were lodged between 1977 and 1987. 
333 cases were filed in 1991 alone; the yearly number of cases kept growing 
steadily, reaching 450 in 1997.45 About 54% of the 5,666 parties involved in 
ICC arbitration have come from Western Europe. The most frequently 
represented nationalities are, in order, France, the United States, West Germany, 
Italy, the UK, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Belgium, Egypt, Spain, 
Austria, Rumania, Sweden, and Greece. A recent development is the upsurge of 
ICC arbitration involving parties from Eastern Europe, Latin America, and 
South East Asia (7.9%, 11.5%, 9.5% respectively of all parties in 1996).46
The London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA): The LCIA is 
another long-established arbitration institution. It was inaugurated in 1892 as 
'The London Chamber of Arbitration’ on the initiative of the Corporation of the 
City of London and the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry. In 1903, 
the name of the tribunal was changed to the 'London Court of Arbitration'. A 
joint Committee, comprising representatives of the Corporation of the City of 
London and the London Chamber of Commerce, was formed to administer the 
activities of the Court. In 1975, the Institute of Arbitrators (later to become the 
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators) joined the other two administering bodies. In 
1981, the name was changed to the London Court of International Arbitration, 
to reflect the nature of its work, which was moving steadily from domestic to 
international arbitration. In 1986, the LCIA was incorporated as a limited 
company under the control of a Board of Directors. It is composed of a 
President, w'ho is also the Chairman of the Board of Directors, four Vice- 
Presidents and about 20 other members, all of whom are international 
arbitrators from major trading countries. The number of members drawn from 
the UK is restricted to no more than one quarter of the total. The Court is 
assisted by a small London-based secretariat of about five people.
44 The ICA returns about 15-20 percent of the awards to the arbitrators for revision. See 
Dezalay and Garth 1996, 47-48; and Smit 1994, especially 68-72.
45 Craig, Park, and Paulsson 1990; The ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, 
various issues.




























































































The LCIA is somewhat less involved in arbitration proceedings than the 
ICA. Its main function is to select arbitrators or to confirm party-nominated 
arbitrators. Like the ICA, the LCIA has the right to reject party-nominated 
arbitrators if it judges that they are not independent or that they are otherwise 
unsuitable. The LCIA fixes the arbitrators’ fees, ensures that the arbitrators 
comply with the procedural timetable and respect all other rules of LCIA 
arbitration. Unlike the ICA, the LCIA does not require arbitrators to draft terms 
of reference, nor does it scrutinize arbitral awards.
Despite recent efforts to further internationalize its services, notably 
through the creation of four so-called 'Users Councils’ for Europe, North 
America, Asia-Pacific, and Africa, the LCIA remains an institution with a 
British bent.47 This is reflected, for example, in the fact that all LCIA presidents 
until 1993 were British, and that 60% of Court-selected arbitrators and 65% of 
party-nominated arbitrators are nationals from the UK. The parties most 
frequently involved in LCIA arbitration come from the UK, the US, Australia, 
Canada, India, and Hong Kong.
The Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC 
Institute): A frequently named third major international arbitration institution is 
the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. It was 
established in 1917 as an independent entity within the Stockholm Chamber. 
The SCC Institute is composed of a Board of three members (and three 
deputies). The chairman of the Board has to be a judge with expertise in 
commercial and industrial matters. Of the two other members, one has to be a 
practising lawyer, the other “a person who enjoys the confidence of the business 
community.”48 The Board is assisted by a small secretariat.
Similar to the LCIA, the SCC Institute’s main role is to act as an 
authority to appoint arbitral tribunals. Challenges against arbitrators are handled 
directly by the Board. The rules of the SCC Institute require that a tribunal deal 
with a case in an 'impartial, practical, and speedy fashion’, give each party 
'sufficient opportunity to present his case’, and reach a decision 'no later than 
one year after the case has been referred to the arbitral tribunal’.49
47 Users'Councils’have been set up to keep the international business community apprised of 
the arbitration services offered by the LCIA and to identify the changing needs of business to 
be able to respond quickly to these needs. Membership in Users’ Councils’ is by invitation; 
members include lawyers, arbitrators, and multinational industrial, commercial, and trading 
organizations.
48 Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 1988, paragraph 2.




























































































The development of the SCC Institute into a major center of international 
commercial arbitration dates from the 1970s when Americans and Soviets 
agreed that trade contracts between the two countries should contain a clause 
providing for arbitration according to the rules of the SCC Institute. The 
caseload of the Institute grew to a yearly average of about 35 in the 1980s and 
100 in the 1990s. In 1997, 82 international cases and 29 domestic cases were 
registered with the Secretariat. The most frequently represented nationalities in 
SCC international arbitation cases in recent years have been Russian. Ukranian. 
and American.
4. EXPLAINING FORUM SELECTION AND INSTITUTIONAL 
VARIETY
Actors engaged in international trade and investment face several types of 
uncertainty: 1) Uncertainty about the preferences and behavior of contractual 
partners; and 2) uncertainty about the present and future ’state of the world.’ 
These types of uncertainty and their varying implications for the selection of 
particular institutional designs are discussed in turn. The last subsection also 
considers the issues of the number of parties involved in a dispute and the 
parties’ relative bargaining power and draws their institutional implications.
Uncertainty about preferences and behavior
Uncertainty about preferences and behavior varies with the relative intimacy of 
a relationship between parties involved in international exchange. Intimacy or 
closeness of a relationship, in turn, depends on the parties’ homogeneity, their 
frequency of interactions, and their distance, from each other. Robert Cooper 
and Janet Landa, for example, have documented how traders belonging to 
ethnically homogeneous commercial groups, such as the East Indians in East 
Africa, the Syrians in West Africa, and the Chinese in Southeast Asia, 
experience considerably lower levels of behavioral uncertainty when dealing 
with each other than when dealing with outsiders.50 One reason is that such 
trading groups serve as repository of trust which reduces the probability of 
breach on a contract between insiders.
Disputes may occasionally erupt even among insiders, but they are likely 
to be resolved more cooperatively than conflicts among strangers.51 Marc 
Galanter, a leading exponent of the law and society movement, has argued that
50 See, for example, Cooper and Landa 1984; and Landa 1981. See also Greif 1992; and 
Curtin 1984.




























































































"in order to understand the distribution of [domestic] litigation, we must go 
beyond the characteristics of individual parties to consider the relations between 
them. Are the parties strangers or intimates? Is their relationship episodic or 
enduring? Is it single-stranded or multiplex?"52 He finds that, generally, the 
more inclusive and enduring a relationship between a set of parties, the less 
likely disputes will be taken to official fora (public courts); instead, such parties 
will seek to resolve their differences in so-called ’embedded’ fora, that is, fora 
that are part of the social setting within which a dispute arose.53 A classic 
illustration of ’embedded’ commercial interactions and dispute resolution is 
Stuart Macaulay’s study of local business practices among firms in Wisconsin. 
Macaulay finds that uncertainty regarding contract performance is reduced by 
widely accepted local norms (e.g., ’commitments are to be honored in almost all 
situations - one does not welsh on a deal’, and ’one ought to produce a good 
product and stand behind it’) and by close personal relationships across the 
boundaries of local business organizations. He notes: "Salesmen often know 
purchasing agents well. The same two individuals occupying these roles may 
have dealt with each other...[during up to] 25 years. Each has something to give 
the other...[T]op executives may [also] know each other. They may sit together 
on government or trade committees. They may know each other socially and 
even belong to the same country club."54 Disputes in this business community 
are frequently settled without reference to the contract or potential or actual 
legal sanctions. "If something comes up, you get the other man on the telephone 
and deal with the problem...One doesn’t run to lawyers if [one] wants to stay in 
business."55
These examples help to shed light on the varying degrees of 
centralization of fora of international commercial dispute resolution, suggesting 
the following conjecture: Centralization o f fora to which private international 
parties resort to resolve their disputes increases with the uncertainty about the 
parties’ preferences or behavior (CENT|UNCERT).56 Centralization implies a
52 Galanter, Marc. 1993. Reading the Landscape of Disputes. UCLA Law Review 31:24.
53 See also Galanter 1981. For examples of embedded fora, see Doo 1973; Note 1970; 
Bernstein 1992; and Maitland 1936.
54 Macaulay 1963, 63.
55 Ibid., 61.
56 It should be noted that I am not primarily interested in knowing what dispute resolution 
clause the parties write into a contract but what method they ultimately use. The contractual 
provision may differ from the actual method used. For example, parties that write an ICC 
arbitration clause into their contract may decide to use ad hoc arbitration when a dispute 
erupts. Similarly, parties may choose some form of arbitration rather than complying with a 
jurisdiction clause. Some contracts have no provision for dispute resolution; in these cases the 
parties will choose the appropriate forms when disputes erupt, provided the parties have an 




























































































high degree of central provision of procedural safeguards and information. Such 
provision is characteristic of institutional arbitration; it is absent, however, in ad 
hoc arbitration or ADR (see Table 1).
Parties involved in an ongoing mutually beneficial relationship (possibly 
with dealings along many different fronts) are less likely to rely on highly 
institutionalized dispute resolution forms than parties with no anticipated future 
relationship, that is, parties that are not repeat players or do not belong to some 
close-knit trading community. There are two reasons. First, parties in a 
continuing relationship can more easily control each other because the expected 
future gains can serve as a hostage.57 They are locked in a 'win-win’ situation; 
thus each other's behavior is quite predictable, for the parties have little to gain 
(but potentially much to lose) from using dilatory tactics or adopting other 
forms of non-cooperation. They are anxious to maintain good relations and are 
therefore likely to be interested in reaching a quick and amicable settlement. 
Second, parties in a continuing relationship typically have good information 
about each other's past behavior, past problems, and past solutions. This 
knowledge may be usefully brought to bear to a new instance of conflict.
International arbitrators and lawyers I interviewed have confirmed the 
importance of the nature of a business relationship in determining how a dispute 
is likely to be resolved. Typically, parties in long-term relationships have a 
strong preference to settle disputes by ADR or ad hoc arbitration. This finding 
is also supported in several writings. Bertie Vigrass, former Registrar of the 
London Court of International Arbitration, summarizes the evidence as follows: 
"In the traditional fields of arbitration, such as maritime, construction, 
insurance, and commodity, it is usual for the majority of arbitrations to be "ad 
hoc" in nature. This is probably because there is an on-going relationship 
between parties, their legal representatives and arbitrators."58 Four leading 
international arbitrators, Martin Hunter, Jan Paulsson, Nigel Rawding, and Alan 
Redfem, have similarly noted that "ADR provides an effective means of 
resolving disputes between parties who have an interest in maintaining an on­
going business relationship. The parties approach the process in an spirit of 
negotiation and compromise, instead of adopting the adversarial positions 
associated with litigation."59
No long-term relationship, however, will last forever. Construction, 
licencing, distributorship, joint venture, and other long term contracts will
57 On the role of hostages in economic exchange, see Williamson 1983; and Kronman 1985.
58 Vigrass 1993, 469. See also Graving 1989, 368.
59 Hunter, Paulsson, Rawding, and Redfem 1993, 73. See also Perlman and Nelson 1983, 232; 




























































































eventually expire, and relationships will come to an end. Logically, such 
changes will also affect the ways in which disputes that arise after a business 
relationship has ended will be resolved. James Myers, head of a major 
international construction group, describes the situation in the context of 
complex long-term construction contracts as follows:60 At the onset, the 
contractor, the employer, and the engineer are all anxious to maintain a 
harmonious working relationship with each other. They realize that the ability 
of one party to perform over an extended period of time is based on the 
cooperation of the others. Disputes, when they arise, will be resolved swiftly, 
fairly, and in a friendly fashion. ADR and ad hoc arbitration are the preferred 
methods of dispute resolution in such settings. Parties may sometimes even 
refrain from presenting claims, lest the relationship be strained. Once the project 
is completed, however, the parties’ attitudes are likely to change. A contractor 
who has no further business with the employer may now feel no compunction 
about demanding payment for additional costs accumulated during the course of 
the construction, and the employer will have no hesitation in dismissing such 
claims as baseless. Myers notes:
"[P]roceedings which occur after the completion of an [international construction] 
contract...are resolved in a distinctly adversarial atmosphere in which large sums of 
money are sought, with little or no ’commercial downside’ - meaning that the 
commercial relationship has normally expired and the parties have nothing to lose by 
refusing to accommodate each other for the sake of continuous harmonious 
commercial relations."61
It is apparent from this example that good will, the prerequisite for 
successful use of ADR or ad hoc arbitration, can no longer be taken for granted 
after a contractual relationship has ended. In such a situation, ADR and ad hoc 
arbitration are doomed to failure, but institutional arbitration is in its element. 
The following example, a typical institutional arbitration case, illustrates how 
procedural safeguards and monitoring provided by arbitral institutions help to 
overcome the difficulties posed by bad faith and adversarial tactics.62
In 1987, a large German company (the claimant) entered into an 
agreement with a firm in Colombia (the defendant), granting the firm the 
exclusive licence to manufacture and distribute certain pharmaceutical and 
biological products in Colombia for four years. In 1991 the company decided 
not to renew the licence agreement, and one year later, it initiated arbitration 
proceedings claiming that the defendant had breached certain of its surviving
60 Myers 1991. See also Schwartz. 1995; Stipanowich 1996; and Vagts 1987.
61 Myers 1991,316.
62 The example is based on a true ICC arbitration case; it captures many of the features typical 




























































































obligations, such as reporting inventory and sales of the licenced products and 
refusing to pay substantial sums. The Colombian firm refused to respond to 
these claims.
In this case, the conflict erupts after one party decides to put an end to a 
business relationship. For the Colombian firm, the termination of the contract 
seems to have triggered a change in its view about the necessity of acting 
cooperatively. Defection from 'surviving obligations’ may be seen as an 
attractive strategy because it brings immediate gains without imposing an 
obvious long-term cost. Such an uncooperative disposition typically also 
pervades the dispute resolution process in this type of cases. For example, the 
defendant could try to evade the contractual obligation to arbitrate the dispute, 
arguing that the matter falls under its national jurisdiction and can only be 
decided in a national court according to national law and procedural rules. This 
is precisely the strategy that the Colombian party took. It wanted the case to be 
tried in Colombian courts under Colombian law. If this fails, the defendant may 
seek to derail the arbitral proceedings by disagreeing on the choice of 
arbitrator(s), procedural rules, place and language of arbitration, and applicable 
law. It could also try to delay the proceedings by failing to appear on dates 
selected for hearings or by raising questions over procedural matters. If none of 
these dilatory tactics succeeds, the defendant still has the option of challenging 
the arbitral award before a national court, on the basis that the arbitral tribunal 
exceeded its jurisdiction, or that there was a substantial miscarriage of justice in 
the course of the proceedings. Finally, the party may choose simply not to honor 
the arbitral award.
Ad hoc arbitration demands little more than simple coordination on the 
arbitrators, procedural rules, applicable law, and place of arbitration. The 
institutional demands on cases like the German-Colombian one are much more 
complex. Extensive monitoring and strong institutional safeguards are 
necessary to deprive potential bad faith and other forms of 'defection' of their 
effects in such cases.
The ICA of the International Chamber of Commerce provides an example 
of an organization well equipped to handle such 'difficult' cases. Its rules and 
institutional apparatus effectively override obstacles that a non-cooperative 
disposition by one of the parties may pose. For instance, if one of the parties 
refuses to take part in the arbitral proceedings, the ICA is entitled to appoint the 
arbitrator(s) and constitute a tribunal. The notice and summons procedure is 




























































































arbitrators that the defaulting party had notice of the arbitration.6’ If one party 
fails to sign the Terms of Reference, the 1CA may approve them and the 
proceedings continue. After the Terms of Reference are approved, the 
opportunity for a party to engage in dilatory tactics by presenting additional 
claims and counterclaims is minimized because such claims can only be heard 
upon the agreement of all parties.63 4
The Court closely monitors the arbitral proceedings, ensuring that time 
limits and due process principles are respected.65 It replaces arbitrators who do 
not fulfil their functions or are behind in their work. At the end of the process, it 
scrutinizes the award in relation to jurisdiction and applicable law. This 
monitoring and checking increases the quality of the arbitral award which, in 
turn, reduces the chance that the award will be challenged by the losing party in 
a national court. As noted by an experienced international arbitrator, “most final 
awards rendered under ICC auspices are carried out voluntarily by the parties, 
because [of their high] quality...[A] company that fails to carry out an [ICC 
award] is almost certain to lose subsequently]66 and in addition runs the risk of 
jeopardizing its reputation in international circles.”67 Indeed, only about 6 
percent of all ICC awards have been challenged by the losing party, and a 
minute 0.5 percent of awards rendered under the aegis of the ICC have been set 
aside by a national court.68
It is easy to see why ad hoc arbitration or ADR are ill-suited for situations 
represented by the German-Colombian case. If at any stage of the proceedings 
in ad hoc arbitration or ADR matters go unexpectedly awry and one of the 
parties starts acting in bad faith, there is no international supervisory institution 
to coerce compliance with procedural rules.69 Furthermore, if the award
63 Aksen 1991, 12.
64 Ibid., 13.
65 Due process principles include transparency of the arbitral process, the right of the parties to 
be called and heard , and equal treatment of the parties in the exchange of pleadings, in 
evidentiary matters, in resort to expertise proceedings, and in the holding of hearings.
66 In other words, when the winning party applies to a national court for recognition and 
enforcement of the award.
67 Aksen 1991, 22. See also David 1985, 45; and Hunter, Paulsson, Rawding, and Redfem 
1993, 10.
68 Craig, Park, and Paulsson 1990, 32-33; David 1985, 50.
69 The type of problem that can arise in ad hoc arbitration is illustrated in a recent case 
(Intercarbon Bermuda v. Caltex Trading and Transport), in which one party refused to proceed 
with an arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause that provided for no institution to set the 
arbitration in motion. The claimant was required to spend seven years in litigation before 
obtaining a federal court order compelling arbitration. Park 1995, 70. See also Coulson 1993; 




























































































resulting from ad hoc arbitration is challenged in a national court, it will be 
considerably more difficult for the winning party to prove to the court that due 
process rules were respected and the tribunal was impartial and objective. Not 
surprisingly, national courts are much more comfortable confirming commercial 
awards that result from a monitored arbitration process than those produced by 
ad hoc proceedings.70
Uncertainty about the present ’state of the world’
Uncertainty about the present ’state of the world’ is a variable that is useful in 
understanding the selection of different arbitration options. It refers to the 
extent to which actors involved in international exchange are knowledgeable 
about international commercial arbitration, and possess information about the 
legal environment (the laws and the integrity of local judges) in which 
arbitration takes place and about the conditions for enforceability of arbitral 
awards. Good information on legal environment and enforceability is a 
prerequisite of successful resolution of commercial disputes. The conjecture 
here is straightforward: The greater the uncertainty about the present 'state of 
the world, ’ the greater the need for centralized information on international 
commercial arbitration and domestic arbitration laws and practices 
(CENT|UNCERT(S)). Such information may be particularly important in cases 
involving traders with little experience in international exchange or traders from 
very different cultural and linguistic regions. Major arbitral institutions help to 
provide the necessary information and procedural guidelines to enable 
inexperienced parties to resolve their commercial disputes in an efficient and 
timely fashion.
Legal environment’ encompasses domestic legislation on arbitration and 
court interpretations of it. The law of the place of arbitration is of great 
importance because it may determine questions of the capacity of the parties to 
agree to arbitration, the validity of the arbitration agreement, the ’arbitrability’of 
the subject-matter of the dispute and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards. Thus, parties seeking to maximize procedural certainty may benefit 
from relying on centralized information on domestic arbitration laws and 
practices; such information will help them choose an arbitral situs where 
annulment of awards is not likely to be facilitated by a bribe to a local judge, 
where the range of non-arbitral legal questions is narrow and well-defined, 
where the integrity of the arbitration process is ensured and any judicial 
meddling with an arbitrator’s substantive decision is minimized, and where 
arbitration decisions are enforceable - if necessary, through execution against




























































































the assets of the losing party by proceedings in national courts of any state in 
which these assets are located.
Some countries have clear arbitration legislation but their courts may 
misapply the law, for example, by adopting over-elastic interpretations of 
’violations of public policy’ as grounds for setting aside awards. Other countries 
may have national laws containing mandatory provisions that override explicit 
contractual stipulations. Two examples serve to illustrate how arbitrary and 
fickle domestic legal decisions regarding international arbitration may be, thus 
underlining the importance of centralized information on developments in 
national arbitration laws and practices:71
The Indian Supreme Court held in May 1992 that if Indian law applied to 
an arbitration clause an application to set aside an award could be heard in 
India, even if the place of arbitration was outside India, and the Indian courts 
could enjoin the enforcement of the award anywhere. In other words, an 
acceptance of Indian law in a contract with an Indian party would ultimately 
lead to the Indian courts irrespective of the choice of a neutral venue.
The second example comes from Singapore. In a 1988 decision, the High 
Court affirmed restrictions on foreign arbitration parties imposed by local 
practice rules. This was followed by a new Singapore Legal Profession Act 
which stipulates that foreign lawyers can only appear in arbitration proceedings 
when the law applicable to a dispute is not Singaporean law. When Singaporean 
law does apply, foreign lawyers may only appear jointly with lawyers who are 
nationals from Singapore.
The second issue of central importance is the enforceability of arbitral 
awards. An award rendered in a given country may not automatically be 
enforceable in other countries where the losing party’s assets may lie. Thus, a 
key function of major arbitral institutions is to collect and continuously update 
information on the conditions of enforceablility of awards in various parts of the 
world. For example, by 1997, over one hundred states had acceded to the 1958 
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards.72 The majority of these states adopted the so-called reciprocity
71 The examples are drawn from Hunter, Paulsson, Rawding, and Redfem 1993.
72 See U.N. Doc E/Conf. 26/SR., 1-25. The standard work on the treaty is Berg 1981. Besides 
the New York Convention, there are at least two other international enforcement conventions, 
the 1975 Inter-American Arbitration Convention (also called the Panama Convention) and the 
1961 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration. In addition to these 




























































































reservation. That means that their courts will enforce an award under the New 
York Convention only if the award has been rendered within the territory of 
another state which has also adhered to the New York Convention.73 A court in 
a signatory country may refuse recognition and enforcement of awards only on 
procedural grounds, including invalidity of the arbitral agreement, denial of an 
opportunity to be heard, arbitrator excess of jurisdiction, arbitral procedure 
contrary to the parties’ agreement, and annulment of the award in the country 
where rendered.74 However, the interpretation by national courts of these 
grounds for denying enforcement of arbitral awards may vary from country to 
country. Therefore, major arbitral institutions also keep information on the 
various national interpretations.
In sum, private firms and their lawyers often may not have sufficient 
information about present ’state of the world’ to avoid expensive delays and 
other negative surprises. This is particularly true if the parties are inexperienced 
in international trade and investment or if they deal with firms from different 
and distant regions.75 Uncertainty about legal environment and enforceability 
can be reduced, at least in part, by relying on information provided by major 
arbitral institutions, such as the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC or 
the London Court of International Arbitration. Such fora have the institutional 
capacity to monitor and record changes in domestic arbitration laws and 
practices around the world, especially if their membership has a broad 
geographic base.
Uncertainty about the future ’state of the world’
Uncertainty about the future ’state of the world’ refers to the susceptibility of an 
issue-area to new developments or unanticipated shocks that may leave parties 
in unchartered legal territory. The conjecture is as follows: The more uncertain 
the future ’state of the world,’ the greater the desirability of a flexible dispute 
resolution method (FLEX|UNCERT(S)), thus establishing a preference of 
arbitration and ADR over litigation in public courts.
provisions. For a brief histoncal account of the development of the various enforcement 
conventions, see Redfem and Hunter 1991, 60-64.
73 Hunter, Paulsson, Rawding, and Redfem 1993, 19. Article III of the New York Convention 
provides that Convention states shall recognize foreign awards as "binding and enforce them 
in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon," 
subject to no conditions more onerous than those imposed on domestic awards.
74 Park 1995,55-56.




























































































The flexibility offered in arbitration and ADR may be valued, for 
example, because it gives firms operating at the forefront of new production and 
exchange methods the possibility of appointing experts who have the necessary 
technical knowledge to evaluate complex new situations; an ordinary judge 
cannot be expected to have this specialized knowledge. Complex technical 
issues may arise in cases dealing with transfer of technology, industrial 
property, trademarks, technical know-how. and financial products. Brian Neill. 
Justice of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, observes: "fC]ases arise 
from time to time which involve questions which lie at or near the frontiers of 
current scientific knowledge. Can they be tried satisfactorily in the ordinary 
courts? There must be doubt."76 7
Flexibility also permits the expert to disregard, to some extent, the 
technicalities of the law in favor of a solution which accords with new business 
practices. An arbitral tribunal, for example, may be given powers of so-called 
amiable composition' or, as it is sometimes put, the right to decide ex aequo et 
bono (meaning in equity and good conscience); that is, the tribunal may reach a 
decision without applying strict legal principles, provided the decision is fair. 
More generally, flexibility allows the parties to tailor the rules - regarding 
procedure, evidence, or even the substance of the case - to their specific needs. 
Thus parties can, for example, limit the extent of disclosure of documents, 
submit evidence in writing, or impose time limits on the length of speeches.'
When uncertainty about the future ’state of the world’ is high, an 
agreement to submit a dispute to a public court may be risky for another and 
more specific reason. The typical jurisdiction clause in an international contract 
provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of a court in a country other than the 
residence of either party. This poses a potential problem, however, in that a 
neutral third-country court may have no nexus to the parties or the dispute and 
may therefore refuse to hear the case.78 The reason for such refusal need not be 
only legalistic-technical; it can be quite practical: Judges are not compensated 
according to the number of cases decided and may thus find little incentive to
76 Neill 1988, 235. For confirming evidence of the importance of this point, see recent survey 
results in Biihring-Uhle 1996, 136-137.
77 Redfem and Hunter 1991, 24.
78 Park 1995, 14. In the legal literature, this is referred to as the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens. The doctrine permits a court to dismiss an action, even if the court clearly has 
jurisdictional power to hear the case, when the relationship between the forum and the dispute 
is insufficient compared to another more convenient relationship. See Lowenfeld 1993, 263- 




























































































take on foreign cases as directed by jurisdiction clauses, particularly if the 
docket is already congested with cases.79
The consequence of a failed jurisdiction clause in an international 
contract can be disastrous. Park explains: "In a domestic context, the failure to 
get into a court in Massachusetts usually implicates no more dramatic an 
alternative than a court in New York or Miami, rather than Boston. Variations 
in language, constitutional safeguards and basic notions of civil procedure will 
be slight. On the other hand, a failed jurisdiction clause in an international 
contract may mean xenophobic judges, a foreign tongue and markedly 
unfamiliar court procedures."80 The reason is that if a court in a neutral third- 
country refuses to hear a case the parties may seek to rush the case to their 
national courts where graft and political influence may compromise procedural 
fairness.
A jurisdiction clause may be rendered ineffective not only by refusal but 
also by the absence of a multilateral convention to enforce court decisions. A 
court in one country may be willing to enforce foreign judicial decisions on the 
basis of discretion, courtesy, or reciprocity; but in the absence of an 
international treaty on enforcement of judicial decisions, a court is free to refuse 
such enforcement.81
Arbitration escapes many of these potential problems. The reasons are 
apparent: First, arbitrators are unlikeiy to decline to hear a case if the parties can 
provide the required deposit to cover costs. However, should an arbitrator 
decline an offer to decide a case, the parties could simply choose another name 
from the many lists of international arbitrators provided by arbitration centers. 
Second, as already mentioned, international treaties bind over one hundred 
countries to enforce foreign arbitral awards.
Number and asymmetry of actors
There are at least two reasons why an international commercial dispute may be 
litigated rather than arbitrated. The determining factors are number of parties 
and power asymmetry.
Numbers: The number of parties in an international commercial conflict 
can be two or more. For example, a complex international industrial operation 
may give rise to multiple contracts involving many parties. A main employer
79 Ibid., 40-41.
80 Ibid., 15.




























































































may have entered into a contract with a main contractor, who in turn contracts 
with various sub-contractors and suppliers. If, for example, the employer has 
complaints regarding the work done, he must arbitrate against the main 
contractor, who must then separately seek to recover from the subcontractor or 
supplier responsible for defective work by way of separate arbitration.s: Such 
proceedings can be excruciatingly slow and forbiddingly expensive.82 3 National 
courts have the advantage of being able to order parties to be joined in court 
proceedings when it is thought to be necessary or convenient. In court 
proceedings, complaints may be passed down the chain of contracts and 
subcontracts to the party or parties ultimately responsible. Arbitration tribunals 
do not have the same coercion power, because arbitration depends on consent.84 
Parties may overcome this weakness if they consent in advance to be joined in 
arbitral proceedings to a clearly defined series of related contracts. To the extent 
that multiparty arbitration takes place, it is mostly organized with the help of 
major arbitral institutions. This is not surprising, considering the considerable 
administrative support required to manage such cases. Nevertheless, a host of 
practical and legal difficulties render multiparty arbitration in many instances 
less appealing than public court proceedings.85
Asymmetry: As discussed above, in most international transactions, it is 
unlikely that a national court located in the country of either party will be 
acceptable to both sides. This is because most parties are instinctively unwilling 
to permit disputes to be determined in the other side’s 'home’ territory. 
Arbitration thus appears as a perfect compromise. Each party chooses an 
arbitrator who is familiar with the party’s language, business practices, legal 
culture, and so on. This contributes to a feeling of confidence in the arbitral 
tribunal. However, a firm with substantial economic leverage may see no need 
to compromise. Park notes: "Multinationals with superior bargaining power 
might...be able to impose a jurisdiction clause that designates their home 
courts."86 Such jurisdiction clauses typically operate in tandem with a choice-of- 
law clause providing that the contract will be interpreted according to the 
substantive rules of the dominant party’s legal system.87
82 Redfem and Hunter 1991, 24.
83 For a striking example, see Kerr 1987.
84 Hunter, Paulsson, Rawding, and Redfem 1993, 41-42.
85 Coe 1997, 66-68; Park 95, 100-101; and Hunter, Paulsson, Rawding, and Redfem 1993, 43.
86 Park forthcoming, 76.
87 Park 1995, 14. Hunter, Paulsson, Rawding, and Redfem make a related argument with 
regard to ADR. They note: "ADR is unlikely to be effective if . there is a large discrepancy in 
the parties’ wealth and resources and, consequently, their bargaing power." Hunter, Paulsson, 





























































































This study has sought to explain the striking differences in the design of various 
institutional methods of international commercial dispute resolution for private 
parties within a self-consciously rationalist framework. It has identified a few 
key factors that account for the wide range of international dispute resolution 
methods, such as litigation in public courts, institutional arbitration, ad hoc 
arbitration, and ADR.
This study has only scratched the surface of a complex but exciting area 
of research for scholars of international relations and other social scientists. 
Several issues evoked in passing merit fuller analysis, notably the role that 
differences in bargaining power play in determining the method of dispute 
resolution. Other interesting questions that remain to be considered are: Why is 
the institutional form of arbitration popular with firms but relatively rare among 
states? How do commercial disputes typically get resolved in cases where one 
of the parties is a state agency?
An area of particular interest for the purpose of extending this study is 
specialized arbitration, for example, as conducted in maritime affairs or as 
offered by various stock and commodity exchanges. Such arbitration is typically 
conducted within commercial groups with strong national roots. For example, 
the British Coffee Trade Federation numbers over one hundred firms as 
members, including the leading roasters, merchants, brokers, and wharfingers in 
the UK. Notwithstanding its national base, the Federation is linked to a wide 
network of transnational commodity organizations such as the Committee of 
European Coffee Associations, the European Federation of Coffee Roasters 
Associations, and the Federation of Commodity Associations. This then raises 
yet another question for further research: How does this ’institutional 
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